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Ours may be an age of storytelling, but it is also an age in which nar-
rative has been fiercely criticized. Already in the 1920s, Virginia Woolf 
famously argued that in the name of “likeness to life” literature should 
have “no plot, no comedy, no tragedy”: “Life is not a series of gig-lamps 
symmetrically arranged” (1925, 188–89). It was first and foremost in 
response to the Second World War and the Holocaust, however, that 
narrative came to appear as ethically problematic. Essential to what 
Nathalie Sarraute (1956) called the age of suspicion, in postwar France, 
was the conviction that after Auschwitz it was no longer possible to 
tell stories. Narratives appeared to postwar thinkers to be an ethically 
problematic mode of appropriation, a matter of violently imposing order 
on history and experience that are inherently non-narrative. The most 
influential strand of ethical thinking in twentieth-century continental 
thought, which derives from Emmanuel Levinas’s ethics of alterity and 
its various poststructuralist variations, is resolutely antinarrative. Many 
contemporary Anglo-American philosophers—from Crispin Sartwell 
(2000) to Galen Strawson (2004)—follow suit by attacking narrative 
because fixed narratives falsify or destroy the openness to the singularity 
and freshness of each moment.
This chapter asks why it is that narrative form is frequently considered 
to be ethically problematic and argues that underlying different 
ethical takes on storytelling are drastically different conceptions of 
understanding, which can be best understood in terms of the difference 
between subsumptive and non-subsumptive conceptions of (narrative) 
understanding. While poststructuralist thinkers and other proponents 
of antinarrativism tend to conceive of all understanding in terms of 
the subsumption model that links understanding to appropriation and 
assimilation, philosophical hermeneutics explores the possibility of 
non-subsumptive understanding. After outlining these two approaches 
to understanding, I sketch a non-subsumptive model of narrative 
understanding. In the final part of the chapter, I will discuss the 
non-subsumptive model in dialogue with Jeanette Winterson’s novel 
Lighthousekeeping (2004).
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Two Conceptions of Understanding
That narrative is a mode of sense-making has become a widely shared 
premise of contemporary narrative studies. Opponents and proponents 
of narrative have little disagreement on this issue, and even etymology 
points to the link between narrating and knowing: narrare, the Latin for 
narrating, derives from gnarus, which means “having knowledge of a 
thing”. Narrative is generally seen as a mode of understanding in which 
events or experiences are related to something familiar that renders 
them intelligible by giving them a meaningful context. The philosopher 
J. David Velleman argues that the explanatory force of narrative is based 
on how it encourages the audience to assimilate the narrated events to 
“familiar patterns of how things feel” (2003, 19). Others place the em-
phasis on the cognitive process of explaining experiences or events by 
assimilating them to cognitive scripts or schemas.1 It is precisely the as-
similatory dimension of narrative understanding that makes it ethically 
suspect, in the eyes of many.
When critics argue against narrative as an assimilatory mode of 
understanding, they generally take it for granted that all understanding 
necessarily involves ethically problematic conceptual appropriation. 
They thereby implicitly rely on the subsumption model of under-
standing, which has dominated Western philosophy. In the Cartesian 
tradition, for example, understanding is conceptualized as a capacity for 
forming clear and distinct ideas, and experience is expected to conform 
to the innate ideas of the mind that regulate understanding. Imman-
uel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1998, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 
1781), in turn, envisages understanding as a process of organizing 
sense-perceptions according to general, atemporal categories. A wide 
range of theories similarly conceptualize understanding as a process 
of subsuming something singular (the object of understanding) under 
a general concept, law or model. For centuries, philosophers took the 
subsumption model for granted (in one version or another), and in the 
mainstream analytic tradition, it still appears to be accepted as unprob-
lematic. For example, Velleman (2003) sees no problem in the assimi-
latory logic of narrative when he argues that the explanatory force of 
narrative is based on how it allows us to assimilate the narrated events 
to familiar affective patterns.
In the continental tradition, however, Friedrich Nietzsche launched a 
powerful critique of knowledge by arguing that knowledge as assimila-
tion and appropriation is ethically problematic and inherently violent. 
He linked the violence of knowledge to that of concepts by drawing 
attention to how thought typically masks the singularity of things by 
subsuming them under a single concept: “Every concept comes into 
being by making equivalent that which is non-equivalent” (2001, 145). 
He used the leaves of a tree as an example: each one of them is different, 
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but “the concept ‘leaf’” homogenizes them and makes us forget the 
differences between them (145). The act of knowing that a leaf is a leaf 
is to subsume a singular leaf under a general category. This Nietzschean 
criticism of understanding shapes the twentieth-century continental 
tradition in innumerable ways, including Levinas’s ethical criticism of 
understanding, which he sees in terms of violent appropriation:
In the word ‘comprehension’ we understand the fact of taking 
[prendre] and of comprehending [comprendre], that is, the fact of 
englobing, of appropriating. There are these elements in all knowl-
edge [savoir], all familiarity [connaissance], all comprehension; 
there is always the fact of making something one’s own.
(Levinas 1988, 170)
This conception of understanding also underlies the poststructuralist 
view that the very attempt to understand is ethically suspicious. Jacques 
Derrida, for example, links—like Nietzsche—the violence of under-
standing to that of language: he writes about “the originary violence of 
language” (or “arche-violence”) with reference to how language is based 
on classifying, naming and inscribing “the unique within the system” 
(1997, 112). He relies on the subsumption model when he suggests that 
language eliminates our singularity and thereby also our freedom and 
responsibility: “By suspending my absolute singularity in speaking, I re-
nounce at the same time my liberty and my responsibility. Once I speak 
I am never and no longer myself, alone and unique” (1995, 60). Derrida 
gestures towards a utopian dream of liberation from the violent chains 
of language, but at the same time he is acutely aware of its impossibility.2
The poststructuralist tradition of thought has been instrumental in 
sensitizing us to the ways in which knowledge is linked to mechanisms 
of power, and it articulates the ethical potential of the encounter with 
the unintelligible as an experience that can foster openness to the un-
known.3 However, its way of presenting all understanding and knowl-
edge as ethically problematic is not without its own problems. One of 
its major problems, I argue, is that it takes for granted the subsumption 
model. I would like to suggest that, instead of assuming that all under-
standing is necessarily violent, we should explore wherein resides the 
possibility of non-violent understanding.
In the continental tradition, philosophical hermeneutics provides an 
alternative to the subsumption model.4 The non-subsumptive model of 
understanding starts from the premise that understanding is a funda-
mentally temporal process, which follows the structure of the herme-
neutic circle: when we encounter something new in the world, we draw 
on our preunderstanding, that is, a horizon of understanding shaped by 
our earlier experiences; but instead of simply subsuming the unfamiliar 
under the familiar, the new experience can shape, modify and transform 
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our pre-conceptions. We always understand “something as something” 
(Husserl 1982, 33; Gadamer 1997, 90–92), and our concepts mediate 
this “as-structure”, but new experiences also leave a mark on our con-
cepts. Language is not a fixed, atemporal system, and concepts are in a 
constant state of transformation whenever language is used:
[I]t is obvious that speaking cannot be thought of as the combination 
of these acts of subsumption, through which something particular is 
subordinated to a general concept. A person who speaks—who, that 
is to say, uses the general meanings of words—is so oriented toward 
the particularity of what he is perceiving that everything he says 
acquires a share in the particularity of the circumstances he is con-
sidering. But that means, on the other hand, that the general concept 
meant by the word is enriched by any given perception of a thing, 
so that what emerges is a new, more specific word formation which 
does more justice to the particularity of that act of perception.
(Gadamer 1997, 428–29)
Gadamer describes this as the “constant process of concept formation” 
(429) and emphasizes that “everywhere that communication happens, 
language not only is used but is shaped as well” (2001, 4). The temporality 
of the use of language and of processes of understanding entails that they 
are always already infused with the unfamiliar, strange and other; concepts 
and our conceptions are not closed, fixed vehicles of appropriation but in 
a process of becoming. Fundamental to this hermeneutic conception is 
the performative dimension of language: rather than merely representing 
what has happened, language creates and shapes reality. This view allows 
us to see how understanding, mediated by language, neither necessarily 
perpetuates dominant sense-making practices nor is inevitably oppressive; 
instead, it can also open new possibilities, experiences and realities.
However, even if language never stays the same through time, it is 
obvious that there are ethically crucial differences in the extent to and 
ways in which concepts are transformed in the process of understanding. 
In fact, understanding in the strong hermeneutic sense is successful 
only when it goes beyond merely subsuming new experiences to what 
is already known. In such understanding that is non-subsumptive in a 
strong sense, concepts are transformed so that they do justice to whatever 
is being understood; understanding then “proves to be an event” 
(Gadamer 1997, 309) that involves an element of uncontrollability and 
unexpectedness. Gadamer calls this the negativity of understanding: 
we properly understand only when we realize that things are not what we 
thought they were (353–61). Because of this structure of negativity, the 
hermeneutic model is radically opposed to the subsumption model of un-
derstanding. Instead of subsuming the singular under general concepts, in 
genuine understanding the singular has power to transform the general.
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Hence, I suggest that it is useful to distinguish, within the non- 
subsumptive model, between the structural dimension of non-subsumption 
in all language-usage and a more radical sense of non-subsumption, in 
which understanding is animated by a specific non-subsumptive ethos, 
linked to openness to that which is other. Encountering otherness—that 
which disturbs preconceptions because it does not fit with them—is 
what challenges our preunderstanding and provokes us to change our 
views. That is why Gadamer suggests that genuine understanding—and 
learning—occurs only through receptivity to something so unassimi-
lable that it requires us to transform our preconceptions. He does not 
adequately acknowledge, however, that often—in the absence of the 
non-subsumptive ethos—the opposite happens: lack of openness to the 
challenge presented by the other tends to lead to violent appropriation. 
Nevertheless, the non-subsumptive model of understanding makes it 
possible to acknowledge that even if language and understanding are 
often violent, they are not necessarily, inevitably violent; instead of being 
structurally violent, they can be used for both violent and non-violent—
subsumptive and non-subsumptive—purposes. The non-subsumptive 
model provides a theoretical framework for thinking about the possibil-
ity of non-violent understanding and for articulating the ethical signifi-
cance of the non-subsumptive ethos. It alerts us to the continuum from 
violent, appropriative, subsumptive sense-making practices to ones that 
are affirmatively non-subsumptive and dialogical by being open to the 
unassimilable otherness of the encountered experiences or persons.
A Non-subsumptive Model of Storytelling
The subsumptive and non-subsumptive conceptions of understanding 
have important implications for how one envisages storytelling as a form 
of understanding. The critics of narrative usually subscribe to the sub-
sumption model, according to which the act of storytelling reduces or 
assimilates an irrevocably singular event into an account that appropri-
ates it by giving it a general meaning or explanation. They thereby see it 
as a way of assimilating new experiences into a pre-given mold. Levinas, 
for example, considers narrative to be a violent mode of appropriation 
in which singular experiences, events or persons are subsumed into a 
coherent system of representation: narrative represents them as “fixed, 
assembled in a tale”, as part of a chronological-causal chain that reverts 
“freedom into necessity” and fails to acknowledge that otherness is “un-
narratable”, “indescribable in the literal sense of the term, unconvertible 
into a history” (1991, 42, 166; 1998, 138–39).5 Similarly, Strawson re-
lies on the subsumption model in assuming that narrative limits what we 
can experience and even more: that narrative self-experience entails the 
disposition to subsume one’s life under “the form of some recognized 
narrative genre” (2004, 442). I would like to suggest that contemporary 
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narrative studies should pay more attention, first, to the unquestioned 
subscription of mainstream narrative theories to the subsumption model 
and, second, to the alternative to this model.
Narrative hermeneutics rejects the subsumption model and provides a 
theoretical grounding for an ethics of storytelling that articulates how 
narrative understanding in itself is neither good nor evil.6 Storytelling is 
a temporal process that has the potential to transform our conceptual 
frameworks, even if this potential often remains unrealized. The point 
is, however, that not all narratives aim to produce totalizing explana-
tions or end up reinforcing violent practices of appropriation. Storytell-
ing can function as a vehicle of genuine understanding when it does not 
enact the comfortable subsumption of new experiences into what we 
already know. The hermeneutic conception of the temporal and interpre-
tative nature of communication implies that communication is not just 
about applying general meaning-systems but a process that can involve 
learning, changing and understanding something completely new that 
challenges our previous conceptions and identities.
I argue that the potential of storytelling to function as an ethical mode 
of understanding is based on the possibility of non-subsumptive under-
standing. This link is rarely articulated, but it can be seen to underlie, 
for example, Hannah Arendt’s view that storytelling makes it possible to 
acknowledge the lives of others in their uniqueness without trying to ap-
propriate them through abstract conceptual schemes. She famously links 
the uniqueness of identity to narrative: “Who somebody is or was we can 
know only by knowing the story of which he is himself the hero—his 
biography, in other words” (Arendt 1998, 186). In her account, we are 
unique first and foremost in our capacity to initiate new processes in the 
world—to give birth to the unpredictable—and we reveal our unique-
ness to others through action and speech; while conceptual representa-
tions and definitions tend to reduce the unique “who” to a “what”, she 
suggests that a narrative in which the “who”—the temporal, individual 
subject—is presented as acting in the world in concrete, complex situa-
tions can give expression to the unexchangeable “who” revealed in that 
action (180–81). The subject thereby appears in the process of becoming 
rather than as appropriated in atemporal, conceptual, abstract terms: 
“storytelling reveals meaning without committing the error of defining 
it” (1968, 105).
Walter Benjamin (1977) argued from a similar perspective that story-
telling is about exchanging experiences, and Adriana Cavarero (2000, 
36–45) asserts that the desire for stories is a desire to be narrated—to 
hear one’s own story told by someone else—linked to the desire for an 
identity. Cavarero emphasizes that we could not know the beginning of 
our own story were it not for the stories told by others: no one can remem-
ber their own birth or first years. Life-stories take shape relationally—in 
dialogic relation to others. We do not know who this unique self is, and 
From Appropriation to Dialogic Exploration 9
in searching for an answer to the question of the who we cannot rely on 
mere autobiographical narration; we are dependent on stories told by 
others (Cavarero 2000, 36–45). Both Arendt and Cavarero believe that 
narratives dignify the uniqueness of the individual.
I do not disagree with the Arendtian view that narratives can have 
ethical potential in presenting subjects of action in the temporal process 
of acting and becoming, and in giving more reality, as it were, to lives 
that would otherwise vanish into oblivion as well as to lives that have 
been ill-understood or silenced. However, I also consider it important to 
acknowledge that narratives often have the opposite effect; they can be 
violent, oppressive and manipulative means of appropriation, and they 
can legitimate structures of violence through strategies of naturalization. 
I suggest that in ethically evaluating narratives, it is helpful to distin-
guish, on a differentiating continuum, between subsumptive narrative 
practices that function appropriatively and reinforce cultural stereo-
types by subsuming singular experiences under culturally dominant 
narrative scripts and non-subsumptive narrative practices that challenge 
such categories of appropriation and follow the logic of dialogue and ex-
ploration. Subsumptive narrative practices can never be subsumptive in 
an absolute sense because they take place in time and always include the 
possibility that the act of subsumption leaves a mark on the categories 
(e.g. narrative models or scripts) that are used subsumptively. Never-
theless, there is an ethically decisive difference between narratives that 
aim at subsumptive appropriation and ones that are oriented towards 
non-subsumptive dialogic understanding. This distinction is not meant 
as a binary but as a heuristic tool that helps us place specific cases of 
storytelling on the continuum.
Narrative practices function subsumptively when they reinforce 
problematic stereotypical sense-making practices. Such practices tend 
to hinder our ability to encounter other people in their uniqueness and 
perpetuate the tendency to see individuals as representatives of the 
groups to which they belong according to gender, sexual orientation, 
ethnicity, age, class and so on. Non-subsumptive narrative practices, in 
contrast, problematize simplistic categorization of experiences, persons 
and relationships, as well as control-oriented appropriation of what is 
unfamiliar, foreign and other. They can function as counter-narratives 
that consciously challenge stereotype-reinforcing hegemonic narrative 
practices and provide us with tools to see the singularity of individual 
lives beyond generalizing narratives. While the former frequently use 
naturalizing strategies to mask their own nature as interpretations and 
to take on an authoritative tone, the latter are more likely to include a 
self-reflexive dimension that involves open reflection on their own limits 
and fosters an ethos of openness to the unknown. At their most pow-
erful, narrative practices animated by a non-subsumptive ethos prompt 
us to look beyond our preconceptions, to be open to what we cannot 
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control, to learn from what is new to us, and to engage with it with 
wonder, empathy and curiosity. They place the emphasis on the dialogic, 
temporal process of an open-ended exploration rather than on achieved, 
comprehensive knowledge. They are narratives that lay bare their own 
constructedness, processuality and the movement of telling rather than 
the told.
Recent social analysts have suggested that we live in a post-truth 
world, where politics is driven more by emotion and rhetoric than by 
rational argumentation.7 The British EU Referendum and the 2016 US 
presidential election have provided us with abundant examples of the 
power of storytelling—and particularly of its destructive potential. 
The political campaigns that led to “Brexit” and Donald Trump’s 
election were largely based on producing and reinforcing aggressive 
subsumptive narratives. Such narratives typically present themselves 
as the unconditional truth, not as narrative interpretations. They 
build narrative identities that aspire to be exhaustive, unambiguous 
and unproblematic, based on a clear sense of the difference 
between “us” and “them”. Trump’s speeches abound in examples 
of subsumptive narratives that invoke the dichotomy between “us” 
and “others”. They present the Americans as a unified group that 
is threatened by immigrants and everything “foreign”: “We need a 
system that serves our needs, not the needs of others. Remember, 
under a Trump administration it’s called America first” (Bump 2016). 
In his Manichean world-view, not closing the borders from foreign-
ers will lead to complete chaos: “The result will be millions more 
illegal immigrants; thousands of more violent, horrible crimes; and 
total chaos and lawlessness. That’s what’s going to happen, as sure 
as you’re standing there” (Bump 2016). This world-view emphasizes 
the importance of control, safety and security—from a perspective 
that takes American middle-class white male privilege for granted 
and explicitly sets out to fight for it against diversity, equality and 
minority rights.
The intersubjective world is shaped by competing narratives, and 
these narratives are not ethically or politically neutral. The “narrative 
in-betweens” that hold people together also divide people.8 The dominant 
narrative in-betweens are frequently based on creating a sense of “us” 
by excluding those perceived as “others”. As Richard Rorty argues, “the 
force of ‘us’ is, typically, contrastive in the sense that it contrasts with a 
‘they’ which is also made up of human beings—the wrong sort of human 
beings” (1989, 190). The force of us was evident in the rise of Nazism in 
the Weimar Republic of the 1930s, and it is evident now that far-right 
extremism, nationalism and populism are on the rise in Europe and the US, 
as narratives that work against inclusion and diversity are increasing their 
power and dominance. Rorty believes that “moral progress” ultimately 
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depends on our ability to expand “our sense of ‘us’ as far as we can” (196), 
towards “greater human solidarity”; it is “the ability to think of people 
wildly different from ourselves as included in the range of ‘us’” (192). 
In the current world situation, it is imperative to find ways of expand-
ing people’s sense of “us” by fostering their capacity to acknowledge 
commonality across and through differences. Our shared vulnerability 
and destructibility suggest possible ways of doing this, as Judith Butler 
(2004, 2009), for example, has argued. At the same time, however, we 
need hermeneutic attentiveness to the way in which ethical understand-
ing begins with acknowledging difference. As Andreea Ritivoi (2016, 63) 
puts it, contra Rorty, “it is important to resist positing similarity be-
tween ourselves and others if we are to maintain the possibility of un-
derstanding them”; a hermeneutic “dialectic of general and particular, 
new and familiar, difference and sameness defines the parameters for 
empathy as the product of a situated understanding” that narrative can 
make possible (61). Narratives, however, are far from ethically equal 
in the ways in which they enact the dialectic of general and particular, 
and we currently sorely need ones that succeed in doing it in ethically 
sustainable ways.
The need for a new global movement against the rise of right-wing 
populism is currently being voiced in the international community 
across religions, nations and political parties. Many agree that a new 
democratic left needs to build itself around the idea of inclusion and 
diversity. One of the writers who has articulated the need for a new 
counter-narrative, in response to the British EU referendum result, is 
the British author Jeanette Winterson. She writes about “the power of 
the stories we tell”, suggests that Labour as a word and story has become 
outdated and argues for the need for new, better stories that would unite 
forces of solidarity in these dark times:
Everything starts as a story we tell ourselves about ourselves. Every 
political movement begins as a counter-narrative to an existing nar-
rative. … To change the way we are telling the story of our country, 
the story of our world, does need more than facts.
(Winterson 2016)
I agree that we need new stories to transform the narrative in-between 
that used to bind together the forces that fight for solidarity across dif-
ferences. We also need more acute awareness of storytelling as a process 
that always takes shape from a particular perspective and engages with 
the world in various ways—such as appropriatively or in the mode of a 
non-subsumptive, explorative dialogue. In the last part of this chapter, 
I will analyze Winterson’s Lighthousekeeping as an example and explo-
ration of non-subsumptive storytelling.
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Dialogic Storytelling in Jeanette Winterson’s 
Lighthousekeeping
Jeanette Winterson’s Lighthousekeeping (2004) is a novel about 
storytelling. It can be characterized by the term metanarrativity: it 
self-reflexively reflects on the significance of storytelling for human 
existence and identity.9 Through its key metaphor of the lighthouse, 
it explores how to live—and how to orient oneself—in a world that is 
like a constantly changing dark, chaotic sea, and it suggests that stories 
shared with others can create flash-like moments through which people 
search for meaning. The novel shows how narratives can be both ethi-
cally valuable and questionable, and it presents as ethically crucial the 
distinction between subsumptive “grand narratives” that aim at appro-
priation and non-subsumptive storytelling that functions in the mode of 
dialogic exploration.
Lighthousekeeping not only thematizes narrative sense-making but 
also embodies a certain conception of storytelling through its narrative 
form. The novel has a fragmentary shape: it consists in interlacing story 
fragments that function like flashes of light that travel across time. They 
momentarily bring together different times, but instead of forming a 
coherent narrative, they produce a discontinuous interplay of light and 
dark. The novel is set in Salts, a Scottish “sea-flung, rock-bitten, sand-
edged shell of a town” that harbors a lighthouse (Winterson 2004, 5). 
The protagonist is an orphan called Silver, looked after by Pew, a blind 
lighthouse-keeper, for whom keeping the light is inseparable from 
storytelling:
‘I must teach you how to keep the light. Do you know what that 
means?’ I didn’t. ‘The stories. That’s what you must learn. The ones 
I know and the ones I don’t know.’ How can I learn the one’s you 
don’t know? ‘Tell them yourself.’ 
(40)
The novel is structured around the idea that our lives are shaped by stories 
that we have inherited, experienced or invented and that we pass on in 
our own versions. It entwines intertextuality—the idea that literature 
arises from literature—and internarrativity—the idea that stories, 
including life-stories, take shape in a dialogic relation to other stories. 
Instead of presenting stories as fixed and concluded, it foregrounds the 
process of storytelling, which underlies their open-ended, tentative and 
non-subsumptive nature.
The novel abounds in stories that Pew tells Silver and Silver goes on 
to tell her lover, a woman she meets in Athens. The most important of 
these is Babel Dark’s story. In 1828, Josiah Dark built a lighthouse in 
Salts and his son Babel was born. Years later, in Bristol, Babel Dark 
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falls in love with Molly, who later becomes pregnant by him, but after 
seeing Molly in the company of another man (who later turns out to 
be Molly’s brother) he is riven with jealousy and assaults her; unable 
to face the uncertainty, he decides to leave everything and starts a new 
life. He moves to Salts as a pastor and marries a woman whom he does 
not love. Later he meets Molly again, realizes that he still loves her and 
begins to live a double life, spending two months a year in Bristol with 
Molly as Babel Lux and the rest of the year in Salts as Babel Dark. While 
the novel as a whole can be read as a rewriting of Robert Louis Steven-
son’s Treasure Island (1883), Dark’s story evokes Stevenson’s Strange 
Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde (1886), but it unsettles the subtext’s 
black-and-white constellation. The irreproachable, respectable life of 
Babel Dark is joyless and loveless; as Lux he comes back to life. He 
tries to explain this to Stevenson, who is also a character in the novel, 
related to Dark “through the restless longing” and whose story of Jekyll 
and Hyde is inspired by Dark (Winterson 2004, 26): “Stevenson had 
not believed him when Dark told him that all the good in his life had 
lived in Bristol with Molly. Only Lux was kind and human and whole. 
Dark was a hypocrite, an adulterer and a liar” (187). Silver uses Dark’s 
story as a mirror, to reflect on her own life, and realizes that “it is neces-
sary to find all the lives in between” (161).
The whole novel is structured around the tension between grand 
narratives and the telling of story fragments—or between narrative 
appropriation and storytelling as a process of search, exploration and 
dialogue. Christianity and evolution theory represent grand narratives 
that have been integral to Western historical imagination; they set 
out to provide an overall, subsumptive explanation of life and history. 
The novel depicts how Darwinism—by approaching life as “always 
becoming” (150)—challenges the stability, security and anthropocen-
trism of the Christian world-view and puts the world in flux: “Darwin 
overturned a stable-state system of creation and completion. His new 
world was flux, change, trial and error, maverick shifts, chance, fateful 
experiments, and lottery odds against success” (170). Dark, however, 
clings obsessively to the old order: 
He had always believed in a stable-state system, made by God, 
and left alone afterwards. That things might be endlessly moving 
and shifting was not his wish. He didn’t want a broken world. He 
wanted something splendid and glorious and constant.
(119–20)
The novel articulates the destructiveness of his inability to live with the 
flux, ambiguity and uncertainty that are integral to human life in its 
fragility.
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Although Darwinism puts the world in flux, the novel also shows how 
it functions subsumptively and aspires to provide an exhaustive explana-
tion. Both Christianity and Darwinism purport to tell the whole story, 
but while the former fails to explain the change and contradictions that 
are integral to life, the latter cannot account for love: “Love is not part 
of natural selection. … In the fossil record of our existence, there is no 
trace of love. You cannot find it held in the earth’s crust, waiting to be 
discovered” (170). The counterpole of these grand narratives are the late 
modern small stories that do not aim at narrative appropriation. The key 
metaphor of the novel, the lighthouse, characterizes the evanescence of 
these story fragments: they function like flashes of light that afford us 
moments of insight but no overall sense of mastery. They are compared 
to a light that shines across the sea to provide a momentary structure to 
the darkness:
Later … he told anyone who wanted to listen what he had told him-
self on those sea-soaked days and nights. Others joined in, and it 
was soon discovered that every light had a story—no, every light 
was a story, and the flashes themselves were the stories going out 
over the waves, as markers and guides and comfort and warning.
(41)
The imagery of sea and light that pervades Lighthousekeeping links 
the novel to the Woolfian tradition and its conception of reality as 
something fluid and chaotic that evades attempts at narrative mastery.10 
In Virginia Woolf’s To the Lighthouse (1927), for example, the sea 
manifests the chaotic, fluid formlessness of reality, and the light across 
the water conveys the way in which humans can momentarily see reality 
as meaningful, in an epiphany that then fades back to darkness. The 
narrative structure of the novel manifests the disintegration of the 
coherent, unified narrative form of realist novels, but the question of 
significant form has not lost its pertinence, as exemplified by the search 
of one of its characters, the artist Lily Briscoe, for a significant form for 
her painting.11
Lighthousekeeping deals with the human need to find a direction for 
one’s life in a constantly shifting world and relates the search for identity 
to a sea voyage. Silver feels that she is lost as if on a wide-open sea without 
a “string of guiding lights” and with “no place to anchor” (Winterson 
2004, 21). The experience of being lost is linked to that of not conform-
ing to the norms provided by culturally dominant narratives; she is a 
poor, uneducated orphan, later labeled as a thief and a psychotic, and 
her love evades the heteronormative matrix. She asserts that humanity 
“notes every curve from the norm with fear or punishment” (5) and 
observes that people are frightened of Pew, too, “because he isn’t like 
them” (15). But instead of building her sense of herself around her failure 
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to conform to sexual and other societal norms, her approach to life is 
affirmative. Telling about the sea voyage of her life to her lover, Silver 
suggests that the experience of being lost turned out to be a new be-
ginning: “I had no idea where to look, or what I was looking for, but 
I know now that all the important journeys start that way” (33). When 
we travel towards a set destination, we already know beforehand what 
we will find, whereas not knowing what we are searching for can lead 
us to unexpected discoveries. The search for something unexpected that 
she could recognize as her own defines Silver’s world-making: “‘You’re 
not like other children,’ said my mother. ‘And if you can’t survive in this 
world, you had better make a world of your own’” (5).
Silver’s world-building is one that learns to accept existence as a process 
of constant becoming. While the lighthouse is stable, the sea represents 
the ever-shifting flux of the real: “the sea is fluid and volatile” (17). People 
are different in how they relate to the flux: do they deny it, struggle 
against it or accept it and learn to live with it? Babel Dark is driven 
by the need for a stable foundation for his life, but by fighting against 
change he “made himself feel seasick, listing violently from one side to 
another, knowing that the fight in him was all about keeping control” 
(120). He searches for “solid reliability” from the unchangeable essence 
of God, but he is tormented by doubts and feels that in the end, “God 
or no God, there seemed to be nothing to hold onto” (120). Dark meets 
a wretched fate precisely because he is unable to accept the fundamental 
uncertainty that is an inalienable dimension of human existence. It leads 
him to a life in which he cannot recognize himself. In one notebook, he 
writes “a mild and scholarly account of a clergyman’s life in Scotland” 
and in another, “a wild and torn folder of scattered pages, disordered, 
unnumbered”, he “wrote his life”: “It was not a life that anyone around 
him would have recognized. As time passed, he no longer recognized 
himself” (58–59).
Although Dark wrote his life, he “refused to live” (57); eventually 
he feels like a “stranger in his own life” (65) and ends up wanting to 
“walk slowly out to sea and never come back” (121). Obsessive control 
and the need for stability ruin Dark. Silver learns from this: “It’s better 
if I accept that I can’t control any of the things that matter. My life is a 
trail of shipwrecks and set-sails. There are no arrivals, no destinations” 
(127). She grows to accept that the experiences of meaning and direction 
come as elusive moments of insight, not in the form of a coherent, 
comprehensive—subsumptive—narrative:
[T]he stories I want to tell you will light up part of my life, and leave 
the rest in darkness. You don’t need to know everything. There is no 
everything… The continuous narrative of existence is a lie. There is no 
continuous narrative, there are lit-up moments, and the rest is dark.
(134)
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“Tell Me a Story”
Subsumptive narratives frequently aim at teleological explanation by 
presenting an inevitable sequence of events that leads to an equally 
inevitable end; the story of Darwinism ends in the evolution of higher, 
superior forms of life, Christian narrative in the salvation of the good 
Christians, the Marxist one in the socialist utopia, and the Trumpian 
narrative in “making America great again”, entailing the destruction 
of “anti-American” elements of society. Non-subsumptive narratives, 
in contrast, are open-ended, exploratory and provide no exhaustive 
explanations; instead of a sense of inevitability, they emphasize the 
openness of each moment of action—a sense of how the story can evolve 
in a different direction depending on how the subjects involved act in 
the situation—and of the act of narration, which can always transform 
the story into a different one. The intersecting dialogues of the novel 
emphasize that there is no absolute ending:
Tell me a story, Pew.
What kind of story, child?
A story with a happy ending.
There’s no such thing in all the world.
As a happy ending?
As an ending.
(49)
Stories generate new stories and are recycled from one generation to the 
next in different variations:
These stories went from man to man, generation to generation, 
hooped the sea-bound world and sailed back again, different decked 
maybe, but the same story. And when the lightkeeper had told his 
story, the sailors would tell their own, from other lights.
(39)
Lighthousekeeping emphasizes the open-ended and processual nature 
of storytelling by foregrounding the re-telling of stories from ever new 
beginnings: “The story begins now—or perhaps it begins in 1802 when 
a terrible shipwreck lobbed men like shuttlecocks into the sea” (11–12). 
Stories never end because they are “always beginning again” (93), and 
more important than a sense of an ending (Kermode 1967) is a sense 
of a beginning, the significance of which is thematized throughout the 
novel:
Why can’t you just tell me the story without starting with another 
story?
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Because there’s no story that’s the start of itself, any more than a 
child comes into the world without parents.
(26–27)
Tell me a story, Pew.
What story, child?
One that begins again.
That’s the story of life.
(109)
Arendt emphasizes the importance of new beginnings as the foundation 
of ethical and political agency. Integral to the human condition is the 
ability to initiate something new and unpredictable in the world:
To act, in its most general sense, means to take an initiative, to 
begin … to set something into motion (which is the original meaning 
of the Latin agere) … It is in the nature of beginning that something 
new is started which cannot be expected from whatever may have 
happened before.
(1998, 177–78)
According to Arendt, we are beings who express our “unique distinctness” 
and “insert ourselves into the human world” through speech and action 
(176). She uses the notion of natality to characterize the way in which 
each birth brings to the world a beginning, a new person with the 
capacity to start a “new process which eventually emerges as the unique 
life story of the newcomer, affecting uniquely the life-stories of all those 
with whom he comes into contact” (184). She reminds us that human 
beings, “though they must die, are not born in order to die but in order 
to begin” (246).
Lighthousekeeping emphasizes that as agents we are fundamentally 
dependent on one another. It presents exchanging stories as a dialogic 
process of exploration—a search for identity, connection, orientation. In 
a Benjaminian and Arendtian spirit, the novel suggests that storytelling 
is what ties people together and makes experiences bearable. The motor 
of narration is a powerful desire for stories, encapsulated in the recurrent 
petition that structures the story fragments: “tell me a story”. The ritual 
of asking for a story—Silver asks Pew several times to tell her one, and 
her lover asks her to tell her a story—is integral to the dialogic dynamic 
of the novel. We are able to tell our own stories on the basis of the stories 
we receive from others: “‘if you tell yourself like a story, it doesn’t seem 
so bad.’ ‘Tell me a story and I won’t be lonely’” (Winterson 2004, 27).
The novel suggests that we need stories to make sense of where 
we are coming from and where we are going; stories provide us with 
“imaginative variations” of the self (Ricoeur 1986, 131) in relation to 
which we can explore who we are and who we could be. In the novel, 
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the stories—including life-stories—are always discontinuous and plural: 
“‘Do you feel you have more than one life perhaps?’ ‘Of course I do. It 
would be impossible to tell one single story’” (Winterson 2004, 160). 
The novel foregrounds the temporal process of the search for identity 
and the performativity of the shaping of identity through the process 
of telling. Identity is not something pre-given that one could find or a 
task that one could complete. Narrative identity should be thought of 
as a verb-like process, an activity, rather than as a noun (something 
fixed and nameable). The temporality of storytelling is ethically crucial: 
both our understanding of who the characters are and their own 
self-understanding become possible only through the temporal process 
of narrative engagement. The narrative dynamic of the novel—its em-
phasis on processuality, open-endedness and the way in which meanings 
takes shape in dialogic encounters—invites the reader to participate in 
the dialogic, non-subsumptive process of storytelling. Our stories are 
always part of a larger narrative fabric that reaches across time: “These 
were my stories—flashes across time” (232).
Insofar as Lighthousekeeping functions as a rewriting of Treasure 
Island, the treasure that Silver searches for is less concrete and unstable 
than in Stevenson’s novel. In fact, the treasure, in Winterson’s novel, 
seems to be first and foremost those moments when we discover a con-
nection to another person and know for a moment why we have come 
to where we are now: “These moments that are talismans and treasure. 
Cumulative deposits—our fossil record—and the beginnings of what 
happens next” (212). Silver discovers that the ultimate treasure is love, 
the greatest force of life, which entails exposing oneself to what one can-
not control—and is, ultimately, the only thing that matters:
I know that the real things in life, the things I remember, the things 
I turn over in my hands, are not houses, bank accounts, prizes or 
promotions. What I remember is love—all love—love of this dirt 
road, this sunrise, a day by the river, the stranger I met in a café. … 
But love it is that wins the day. On this burning road, fenced with 
barbed wire to keep the goats from straying, I find for a minute what 
I came here for, which is a sure sign that I will lose it again instantly.
(200–01)
The experience of the meaning of life can only be momentary, like a 
flash of light across the dark sea, but its evanescence makes it no less 
meaningful. In the end, all we have is this moment, and the possibility 
to share it with others: “Don’t wait. Don’t tell the story later. Life is so 
short. This stretch of sea and sand, this walk on the shore, before the 
tide covers everything we have done” (232).
The value of learning to let go of the ideal of control is linked, in the novel, 
to the insight that our stories are always intertwined, so that ultimately 
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nothing is completely our own: “All of us are bound together, tidal, moon-
drawn, past, present and future in the break of a wave. … There it is, the 
light across the water. Your story. Mine. His” (134–35). Accepting one’s 
dependency is interlaced with the insight that we are each other’s beacons 
and coordinates, anchors and strongholds, like Molly to Babel and Silver 
to her loved one. Dependency on others makes us vulnerable—or ship-
wrecked—but accepting it is the condition of possibility for being able to 
share with others the “span of water I call my life” (134).
The Ethos of Dialogic Exploration
This chapter has explored a non-subsumptive narrative logic, arguing 
that it is crucial to the ethical potential of storytelling. While subsumptive 
narrative practices tend to reinforce an ethos of dogmatism and cultural 
stereotypes in explaining singular events in terms of general narrative 
scripts, non-subsumptive narrative practices question such general scripts 
and challenge our categories of appropriation. The non-subsumptive 
model of (narrative) understanding provides a theoretical grounding for 
analyzing the possibility and ethical potential of non-violent narrative 
practices, and it allows us to evaluate different cultural practices on a 
differentiating continuum from subsumptive to non-subsumptive ones. 
Whether subsumptive or non-subsumptive, storytelling has a performa-
tive dimension: it is not just about representing the world but also about 
constructing intersubjective reality. Only non-subsumptive narratives, 
however, are usually aware of—and self-reflexively display—their own 
performative dimension. Such self-awareness is particularly prominent 
in literary fiction, which in many of its finest achievements—such as 
Winterson’s Lighthousekeeping—promotes sensitivity to storytelling as 
an interpretative, explorative process that always emerges from a partic-
ular perspective and in dialogue with other narratives.
In these dark times, it has become increasingly evident that democracy 
depends—as Arendt (1968, 1998) already emphasized—on the recogni-
tion of the diversity and plurality of unique beings. While in Lighthouse-
keeping dialogic storytelling is a process of building an intersubjective 
narrative in-between for those who exchange stories within the fictive 
world, the novel as a whole contributes to the narrative in-between of 
the readers. It fosters awareness of the roles that stories play in our lives, 
of how they can always be told from different perspectives and of the 
importance of learning to live without obsessive fixation on control and 
certainty. It is unlikely that those who would most need such awareness—
including white supremacists, jihadists and others whose lives are struc-
tured by dogmatic black-and-white narratives aimed against diversity 
and inclusion—would read Lighthousekeeping. But the novel encour-
ages us to take an affirmative approach, like Silver, and it reminds us 
that in these dark times tending the light is ever more important.
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Storytelling is a mode of engagement, and we need to be atten-
tive to the divergent forms it takes in different situations; the ethos 
of narrative appropriation is strikingly different from the ethos of 
dialogic exploration. The former pretends to know the answers, the 
latter animates the effort to explore questions that matter most by 
acknowledging that no universal answers are available and that we can 
only learn from one another. Literature may not save the world, but it 
can promote our perspective awareness and make its own small con-
tributions to expanding the sphere of the “we”. It can sensitize us to 
the open-endedness of narratives and to our fundamental dependency 
on one another’s stories—to our condition as internarrative beings. 
When it comes to the question of how to realize the ethical potential 
of storytelling, however, there are no guarantees. Literature can make 
no promises. Ultimately, narratives only function non-subsumptively 
when we are willing and able to engage with them non-subsumptively—
exposing ourselves to what may challenge our beliefs and sensibilities.
Notes
 1 An influential classic of the script theory is Schank and Abelson (1977).
 2 For Derrida (1978), Levinas is guilty of empiricism in not taking seriously 
enough the ways in which language shapes experience and, in consequence, 
how it excludes the possibility of immediate experience; the aporia of ethics 
is that encountering the other non-violently would require that one “does 
not pass through the neutral element of the universal” (96) but, instead, 
encounters the other without the violence of concepts, which, in turn, seems 
impossible.
 3 See e.g. Lyotard (1991, 74); for a broader discussion of this postwar tendency, 
see Meretoja (2014, 13–17, 86–118).
 4 A starting-point for the non-subsumptive model can be traced further back, 
to Kant’s (2002/1790, 74–276) theory of “reflecting judgments”, in his aes-
thetics, in which he acknowledges that not all judgments follow the logic of 
subsuming the object under a known universal, as he had suggested in The 
Critique of Pure Reason. Due to its more radical way of acknowledging 
the temporality and historicity of understanding, however, philosophical 
hermeneutics provides a more productive foundation for a non-subsumptive 
model of understanding.
 5 For a discussion of Levinas’s ambivalent relationship to narrative fiction, see 
Davis (2015).
 6 I develop this view more fully in Meretoja (2018). On narrative hermeneu-
tics, see also Brockmeier and Meretoja (2014) and Meretoja (2014, 2016).
 7 The Oxford Dictionaries chose “post-truth” as the “word of the year” in 
2016, defining it as follows: “Relating to or denoting circumstances in which 
objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals 
to emotion and personal belief” (https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/word-
of-the-year/word-of-the-year-2016). The term is controversial, for example 
because, first, narratives, rhetoric and affect have always been important in 
politics and, second, truth still matters, which is why Trump’s lies cause so 
much outrage across the globe.
 8 I develop the concept of “narrative in-between” in Meretoja (2018), in dia-
logue with Hannah Arendt’s “in-between”, which she defines as a “common 
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world”, which “lies between people and therefore can relate and bind them 
together” (Arendt 1998, 182, see also 50–58).
 9 On metanarrativity, see Meretoja (2014, 2–3, 226–29).
 10 Mine Özyurt Kılıç (2009, xv) links Winterson’s waters to the problematics 
of time in her novels, but I see them as manifesting more broadly her vision of 
the fluid, flux-like nature of reality. A similar vision characterizes Woolf’s 
oeuvre, such as The Waves (1931), in which the narrative fragments follow a 
wave-like rhythm and convey a sense of how it “seems as if the whole world 
were flowing” (20). In her diary, Woolf writes about the idea of a “continuous 
stream, not solely of human thought, but of the ship, the night etc., all 
flowing together” (1982, 107). Winterson sees herself as an “heir of Woolf” 
and emphasizes the significance of the modernist tradition for her work. On 
Winterson’s relationship to modernism and postmodernism, see Andemahr 
(2009, 16–21) and Front (2009).
 11 Winterson makes the intertextual reference explicit: “To the lighthouse” 
(Winterson 2004, 19).
References
Andemahr, Sonya. 2009. Jeanette Winterson. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Arendt, Hannah. 1968. Men in Dark Times. New York: Harcourt Brace & 
Company.
Arendt, Hannah. 1998 [1958]. The Human Condition. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press.
Benjamin, Walter. 1977 [1936]. “Der Erzähler”. In Illuminationen: Ausgewählte 
Schriften 1. 385–410. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
Brockmeier, Jens, and Hanna Meretoja. 2014. “Understanding Narrative 
Hermeneutics”. Storyworlds 7 (2): 1–27.
Bump, Philip. 2016. “Here’s What Donald Trump Said in His Great 




Butler, Judith. 2004. Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence. 
New York: Verso.
Butler, Judith. 2009. Frames of War: When is Life Grievable? New York: Verso.
Cavarero, Adriana. 2000. Relating Stories: Storytelling and Selfhood. London: 
Routledge.
Davis, Colin. 2015. “Levinas the Novelist”. French Studies 69 (3): 333–44.
Derrida, Jacques. 1978 [1967]. Writing and Difference. Translated by Alan 
Bass. London: Routledge.
Derrida, Jacques. 1995 [1992]. The Gift of Death. Translated by David Wills. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Derrida, Jacques. 1997 [1967]. Of Grammatology. Translated by Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Front, Sonia. 2009. Transgressing Boundaries in Jeanette Winterson’s Fiction. 
Frankfurt: Peter Lang.
Gadamer, Hans-Georg. 1997 [1960]. Truth and Method. 2nd edition. Trans-
lated by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald Marshall. New York: Continuum.
Gadamer, Hans-Georg. 2001 [1979]. Reason in the Age of Science. Translated 
by Frederick Lawrence. Cambridge: MIT Press.
22 Hanna Meretoja
Husserl, Edmund. 1982 [1931]. Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phe-
nomenology. Translated by Dorion Cairns. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Kant, Immanuel. 1998. Critique of Pure Reason (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 
1781). Translated by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Kant, Immanuel. 2002. Critique of the Power of Judgment (Kritik der 
Urteilskraft, 1790). Translated by Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Kermode, Frank. 1967. The Sense of an Ending: Studies in the Theory of 
Fiction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Levinas, Emmanuel. 1988. “The Paradox of Morality: An Interview with 
Emmanuel Levinas”. [Interview by Tamra Wright, Peter Hughes, and Alison 
Ainley] Translated by Andrew Benjamin and Tamra Wright. In The Provo-
cation of Levinas: Rethinking the Other, edited by Robert Bernasconi and 
David Wood, 168–80. London: Routledge.
Levinas, Emmanuel. 1991 [1974]. Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence. 
Translated by Alphonso Lingis. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Levinas, Emmanuel. 1998 [1948]. “Reality and Its Shadow”. In The Levinas 
Reader, edited by Séan Hand, 130–43. Oxford: Blackwell.
Lyotard, Jean-François. 1991 [1988]. The Inhuman: Reflections on Time. 
Translated by Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby. Cambridge: Polity 
Press.
Meretoja, Hanna. 2014. The Narrative Turn in Fiction and Theory: The Crisis 
and Return of Storytelling from Robbe-Grillet to Tournier. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan.
Meretoja, Hanna. 2016. “For Interpretation”. Storyworlds 8 (1): 97–117.
Meretoja, Hanna. 2018. The Ethics of Storytelling: Narrative Hermeneutics, 
History, and the Possible. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. 2001. The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings. Edited by 
Raymond Geuss and Ronald Speirs. Translated by Ronald Speirs. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Özyurt Kılıç, Mine. 2009. “Introduction”. In Winterson Narrating Time and 
Space, edited by Margaret Sönmez and Mine Özyurt Kılıç, ix–xxx. Newcastle 
upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
Ricoeur, Paul. 1986. Du texte à l’action. Paris: Seuil.
Ritivoi, Andreea. 2016. “Reading Stories, Reading (Others’) Lives: Empathy, 
Intersubjectivity, and Narrative Understanding”. Storyworlds 8 (1): 51–76.
Rorty, Richard. 1989. Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Sarraute, Nathalie. 1956. L’Ere du soupçon. Essais sur le roman. Paris: 
Gallimard.
Sartwell, Crispin. 2000. End of Story: Toward an Annihilation of Language 
and History. Albany: SUNY Press.
Schank, Roger C., and Robert P. Abelson. 1977. Scripts, Plans, Goals and 
Understanding: An Inquiry into Human Knowledge Structures. Hillsdale: 
Erlbaum.
Stevenson, Robert Louis. 1883. Treasure Island. London: Cassell and Company.
Stevenson, Robert Louis. 1886. Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde. London: 
Longmans, Green & Co.
From Appropriation to Dialogic Exploration 23
Strawson, Galen. 2004. “Against Narrativity”. Ratio 17 (4): 428–52.
Velleman, J. David 2003. “Narrative Explanation”. Philosophical Review 112 (1): 
1–25.
Winterson, Jeanette. 2004. Lighthousekeeping. London: Fourth Estate.
Winterson, Jeanette. 2016. “We Need to Build a New Left: Labour Means Nothing 
Today”. Guardian, June 24. www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/24/we- 
need-to-build-a-new-left-labour-means-nothing-jeanette-winterson.
Woolf, Virginia. 1925. The Common Reader. London: Hogarth Press.
Woolf, Virginia. 1927. To the Lighthouse. London: Hogarth Press.
Woolf, Virginia. 1931. The Waves. London: Hogarth Press.
Woolf, Virginia. 1982. A Writer’s Diary. Edited by Leonard Woolf. New York: 
Harcourt, Inc.

